

Series II  
Subjects Files,  
1916-1973

Box 14, Folder 12

Correspondence,  
Letters received,  
1952

0357

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 2 May 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith two more translations of air action reports for the period after 18 Oct.

CHK

P.S. There was a note from Roger today indicating that he is working on your request for additional documents.

CHK 5-2-52

0358

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

*SW Area Force / SW Area Fleet*  
*(NSB) (GKF)*

*orders & dispatches*

*(CHK*

*)*

0359

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 8 May 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Went through the air document message logs once more with a view to picking up any helpful dispatches not already translated in our previous goings-through for the various major commands. There wasn't much of value left, but a few seemed possibly helpful and are forwarded herewith.

Am shifting back now to the surface unit detailed action reports for the Leyte battle proper. I think we will dispose of the Mobile Force Main Body first, and then go on to the First Striking Force. Where there are unit detailed action reports as well as reports by the individual component ships (i.e., BATDIV 1 report and individual reports for YAMATO, MUSASHI, NAGATO), we will do the unit reports first. Then, possibly, the individual ship reports will not be needed, except where they may contain additional data not found in the unit report. Such portions only would then require translation.

Would appreciate any ideas you have to offer as we embark on this next phase.

CHK 5-8-52

CHK

0360

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt. Rochefort

DATE:

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

(War Diary 211145)

I believe that the document from which these messages were translated is now in your hands. Consequently, I haven't been able to check the translations with the Japanese Text.

Would appreciate your doing this up there unless you prefer to send the document and the attached translations back here.

CHK 5-6-52

CHK.

0361

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~Commodore~~ R.W. Bates

DATE: 6 May 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of one more brief air document re KAMIKAZE air units and of various operations orders and dispatches of major commands - Combined Fleet, SW Area Fleet and 6FEB. These are all pertinent to the period after 18 Oct.

No further word yet from Roger.

Trust you are making rapid progress with the background section.

CHK

CHK 5-6-52

0362



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 45

19 May 1952

Captain J.J. Rochefort  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Captain,

I had just about given up hope of finding anything at all on the Japanese tanker set-up when the thought suddenly popped into my head that the so-called Tables of Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy might show tanker assignments. I hastily looked, and sure enough, there were separate tables entitled "Organization of the Supply Forces". These, of course, cover all types of supply ships - ammunition ships, water ships, store ships, oilers (KYUYUSEN), colliers (KYUTANSEN), and collier-oilers (KYUTANYUSEN).

As you already know from <sup>(our)</sup> use of these organization tables in regard to the air set-up, we have a set of tables dated 15 Aug 1944, and then nothing until 15 November 1944. Hence, the only one of any use to us is the 15 Aug table. It will of course be possible, as I did with the air, to bring the tanker assignments (only administrative, not tactical) up to 10 or 15 Oct by going through the laborious process of finding out what individual changes were made between 15 Aug and either of these dates. However, if you are merely interested in the set-up and don't care about what specific ships were assigned, the 15 Aug table should be enough.

Due to the pooriness of the blow-up and the fact that many of the ship names have been lined out, many portions are illegible - at least with the magnifying glasses we have here. It consequently doesn't seem particularly worthwhile to translate what is legible. You can get a better idea of the overall set-up merely by glancing at the whole table in the original. I am therefore sending you the photostat, on which I have translated the various command headings and also indicated the columns showing oilers.

The horizontal headings are, from top to bottom) 1. SHOZOKU (Command to which assigned); 2. SHUBETSU (Type of ship); 3. JUTO KANSEN (Assigned ships), which is further subdivided into (a) UNSOKAN (regular supply ships); (b) TOKUSETSU UNSOKAN (converted supply ships, predominantly navy crew) and (c) TOKUSETSU UNSOKAN OTSU ("A"-class converted supply ships, predominantly civilian crew); (d) TOKUSETSU UNSOKAN OTSU ("B"-class converted supply ships, predominantly civilian crew). The 4th column heading is ~~illegible~~ not clearly legible but appears to be TOKUSETSU UNSOKAN (KAN) NO SHOKAN CHINJUFU - Naval District to which converted supply ships are administratively assigned. Column 5 is SHOZOKU CHOKAN - commander to whom assigned.

Incidentally, if Column 4 shows administrative assignment, then this table mainly shows tactical assignments (SHOZOKU), which doesn't seem to jibe with what I said earlier. However, I guess the answer is that this

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table gives tactical assignments all right, but not in the sense of tactical organization for a certain operation. It would appear to be rather a basic allocation of supply ships to the operational commands (Sheet 1) and the Navy Ministry, Naval and Guard Districts (Sheet 2).

As regards tankers assigned (ignoring ships lined out and added in by hand), the table shows a total of 21 of all categories assigned to Combined Fleet, 3 to First Mobile Fleet, 1 tanker and 1 collier-tanker to SW Area Fleet, and 1 to CHINA AREA Fleet. The Navy Ministry has 10, and TAKAO Guard District 1. In other words, most of the tankers allotted to the combat commands are assigned to Combined Fleet. Most of the others are under the Navy Ministry, which appears to have had a supply force of its own, presumably not for use with the combat fleet.

With regard to the Combined Fleet tankers, there is an important note which appears at the extreme left of Sheet 1 of the table. It reads, in translation: "Supply units assigned to Combined Fleet will assist in the supply of the First Mobile Fleet and of Combined Fleet attached forces, and will also be employed, as required by the situation, to reinforce the supply of other forces under Combined Fleet command."

In other words, Combined Fleet will attach its tankers to the combat forces under its command when and as required by operations. Here is the answer to the essential question.


A few of the ship names are legible and are as follows: For Combined Fleet - in the UNSOKAN category, HAYATOMO (none of these are MARUS); in the No. 2 category, NICHIEI MARU and RYOEI MARU; and in the No. 3 category, KYOEI MARU, No. 2 KYOEI MARU, No. 3 KYOEI MARU, and TARAKAN MARU. First Mobile Fleet has three ships, all in the No. 2 category: ~~WIPPO~~ NIPPO MARU, AZUSA MARU, and one more that's not too clear but might be ITSUKUSHIMA MARU. SW AREA Fleet has the collier-tanker SHORETOKO in Category 1 and KINREI MARU in Category 3.

AZUSA MARU is listed as sunk 16 Sep 44, which explains why KURITA didn't have her in Oct. The WIPPO, of course, he had. As for the ITSUKUSHIMA, the LYB report listed her as one of the Combined Fleet tankers attached only after the sortie from LINGGA. So this may not be the ITSUKUSHIMA, or if it is, there must have been a change between 15 Aug and mid-October. I will see if I can find anything on this.

Well, I guess that's it. Possibly, if you've got some real high-powered magnifying glass up there, you can get a few more of the ship names.

Am also forwarding herewith the translation of the submarine merit report which I mentioned to you.

Sincerely,

  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl.- 2 pp photostat, 1 translation

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

28 May 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Mr. Cassidy has undoubtedly informed you of our conversation last Friday with regard to the matter of my continuing in this job after the present funds become exhausted in mid-July. I told Mr. Cassidy that I would prefer that he hold up any action on the matter until I had an opportunity to take the matter up directly with you. Since then, I have been turning the whole matter over in my mind with a view to deciding more definitely my own future course. I am, of course, highly gratified to know that you value my contribution to the project enough to want me to stay on longer.

First, I should like to give you a very rough idea of where we stand in the translation work. As you know, we have now exhausted all material available here at present bearing on the background period through 17 Oct, and we have already made a sizable dent in the material covering the Leyte action proper. Everything available on the SURIGAO Strait action was done long ~~ago~~ <sup>ago</sup>, covering both the 1YB 3rd Section (NISHIMURA) and 2YB (SHIMA). (There is one destroyer report (USHIO) not yet translated for 2YB, but it adds little to the documents already done.) As for the Mobile Force Main Body, everything has now been done except a couple of individual ship reports, though I still have to check Mrs. T's translations of five of these documents. (I ought to be able to complete checking these inside of a week.) *All available material on air operations through 25-26 October has also been completed.*

So that is where we are now. It still leaves to be done quite a bit of material covering the 1YB main strength, for which the documents available are relatively more abundant than for the other forces involved. There is undoubtedly more translation work here than can be completed by mid-July, when the funds for paying me run out. However, it ought not to require very many additional months, and certainly not longer than the end of the year, to finish everything up so far as pure translation work is concerned. I cannot make a more definite estimate, since a great deal will depend on whether or not you will need translations of every available document. If some, or possibly many, of the individual ship reports can be dispensed with (where the unit reports are available), except for screening to pick up additional data not found in the unit reports, then I would say that we probably can finish up by fall.

The situation would be affected, of course, if Tokyo should suddenly come forth with a volume of new material, especially on the air and submarine phases. However, frankly I don't expect that Tokyo will be able to provide us with any significant amount of material beyond what

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we have managed to ferret out here. I had a brief note from Roger yesterday indicating that he had obtained from OHMAE a microfilm of about six documents. He didn't say what they were but indicated that this represented all the material available bearing on the questions put in your letter and elaborated upon by me so as to make clear exactly what we already have. Possibly, the documents have to do with the air operations. And whether they are of any real value remains to be seen. In any case, it would appear that we have now gotten from Tokyo just about everything that we're going to get.

In short, then, the prospect is one of a relatively short haul from here on in. In view of that, I wondered, ~~some~~ before Mr. Cassidy talked to me, if perhaps you wouldn't consider it unnecessary to extend my services, and let Mrs. T carry the ball alone from here on in. I sounded her out on this the other day, but she indicated that she isn't very confident of her ability to carry on by herself. As for anything in the nature of analysis and commenting on your manuscript, she said that she would not be able to handle it. In my own opinion, though Mrs. T has not become a 100% accurate translator of Japanese naval documents, she has achieved a fair degree of competence. I agree that she is, however, lacking in analytical ability.

As for my own situation, I am sure that you understand that I am under gradually increasing compulsion to get into a job that is more permanent, lucrative and promising. I have hopes of eventually getting into the State Department, or possibly going back to Japan for another stint with the Army Historical Section in case it is decided to publish the history of Japanese operations against MacArthur, which I edited out there. However, there is no immediate prospect of a job in either of these places, so until something does materialize, I am perfectly willing to stick with this job in the hope of seeing it through.

As regards the terms of my employment, I gather from Mr. Cassidy that it is desired to make this a civil service instead of a special contract job. He seemed to be thinking in terms of a translator rating - the highest in which, I believe, is GS-11, although he did indicate that he thought I could be given as much pay as I now receive. (I just ~~checked~~ checked on this and found it quite correct. The GS-11 pay scale is from \$5940 up to \$6940, while GS-12 starts at \$7,040, and GS-13 at \$8360.)

I am presently receiving \$250 per 2-week period, which comes to \$6500 on a yearly basis. However, I also am saving a few hundred dollars in taxes under the present contract arrangement, since I am able to declare as a self-employed person and thereby obtain substantial deductions that I otherwise would not get. Consequently, to come out with the same amount of pay in civil service, I would need a top GS-11 and probably a GS-12. (It would require some close tax figuring to arrive at the exact answer.)

Also, if my job is made civil service, I shall lose the advantage I have enjoyed under special contract of not being tied down to a strict 8-hour day at the Navy Department, as long as the work was turned out at a satisfactory rate. Actually, the sort of translation work that we are doing

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is quite different from ordinary translation, as you well know. Not only is the material highly technical, but since strict accuracy is a necessity, it requires great concentration and attention to detail. It is consequently a kind of translation that one cannot easily perform eight hours daily and still maintain a high level of speed and efficiency. I prefer to work fast and intensively for a shorter number of hours at a stretch, doing a couple of hours of work at home in the evening from time to time to compensate for the shorter hours spent at the office. I doubt that I would be able to turn out a greater volume of work if I were to put all my time in at the Navy Department under regular civil service hours. At the same time, the greater freedom I have under the contract arrangement has been some compensation for the inadequate pay. It was, indeed, a major reason for my willingness to stick with the job despite the fact that, to make ends meet financially, I have had to supplement my pay with income which I fortunately have from other sources.

Now, since I anticipate that you will not need me anyway for more than 3-6 months beyond mid-July, I would prefer an extension of the present contract arrangement if it is possible for you to obtain a few thousand dollars of additional funds for this purpose. I should think that this could be easily justified on the ground - which is perfectly true - that additional documents have been obtained, requiring translation. Furthermore, on the contract basis, since it is only for a short additional time, I would be willing to continue at the present rate of pay.

The point is, Commodore, that I just cannot - without prejudice to my future employment chances - ~~indeed~~ afford to accept a GS-11 translator rating. I have already held a GS-14 rating as a historian specialist in Japanese military history. Even conceding that a GS-14 rating in Tokyo would not be a GS-14 here in Washington, it wouldn't be less than a 13 in any case. Also, I already have a Civil Service eligibility rating for the highest-grade position in the Intelligence Research Specialist category. GS-12 was the highest grade for which I could apply, and I obtained the eligibility rating for it without difficulty. So I feel that it would be highly prejudicial to me, when and if I seek another Government job in the State Department or elsewhere, to have it down on my employment record that my last job was as a GS-11 translator. This difficulty does not arise with the contract method since I am not stamped with a rating of any kind.

If, therefore, the job is transferred to civil service, I do not see how I can agree to anything less than a GS-12, and even that I am reluctant to do, particularly on so temporary a basis. Quite apart from the matter of prejudice to my future chances, I am sure that you will be the first to recognize that this is quite a bit more than a translating job. It is in fact historical research of a highly specialized nature and in an exceptionally difficult and complicated foreign language. It therefore seems only reasonable that it should have something better than a GS-11 translator rating. A GS-12, incidentally, gets little more actual pay than a Lt. Comdr (average under new pay scale, including allowances), not counting the latter's additional retirement benefits. Also, in case you do not

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already know it, Roger holds down a GS-13 rating. He is perhaps called upon to do things in a somewhat broader field, including some administrative duties that I do not have. However, his basic job is no different in nature, and no more exacting than mine. In fact, as regards research into the Japanese operations, my job is, I think, more exacting and certainly requires a higher level of language competence than Roger possesses, simply because we are going into minute details that Admiral Morison is not concerned with. I consequently do not see why, if I am asked to go into civil service, I should get a rating lower than Roger's. As long as I am on a special contract basis, however, no invidious comparisons need be made, and I can more easily overlook the discrepancy that obviously exists.

Well, Commodore, I sincerely trust that I have succeeded in making my position clear, and that you will not find it unreasonable. What it all boils down to is that, although I think I can agree to go on working for you for a limited additional period on the basis of an extension of the present contractual arrangement, I cannot agree to do so on the basis of a GS-11 civil service rating giving me equivalent pay to what I presently receive. If it is absolutely imperative that the job be transferred to civil service, then, as I have pointed out above, I do not feel that I could possibly consider any rating below 12, and I honestly feel that, on a comparative basis and taking into account the extremely temporary nature of the appointment, I would be justified in asking for a 13.

Please forgive me, Commodore, for taking up so much of your time on this inevitably delicate and distasteful matter. I know that you will be generous and fair in your consideration of my position, and I trust that it will be possible to arrive at some mutually satisfactory arrangement under which I can continue working for you for the additional period that you will have need of my services.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

0368

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates

DATE: 5/28/52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Am forwarding herewith translation of Detailed Action Report for CARDIV 4 (HYUGA, ISE) covering the operations of the ADVANCE GUARD of the Mobile Force Main Body, and of the 6th Group of the K&MB, both of which operated under Com CARDIV 4. This is the only available unit report for the component units of the Mobile Force Main Body. All the other action reports for this force are reports of individual ships. Mrs. T has translated reports for ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO and CHI-TOSE (there is none for CHIYODA), and for ISUZU. I will now proceed with the checking of her translations, and these will be forwarded shortly. The only other ~~remaining~~ reports of K&MB ships, which remain to be translated, are those of ISE (HYUGA we did earlier) and two individual destroyers (KUWA and SHIMOTSUKI). There is no report for TAMA. OYODO report has been translated for some time and only requires checking.

Am writing to you under separate cover today with regard to the matter of my continuing to work on the project when the present funds are exhausted sometime in July.

CHK

(CHIC 5-28-52)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 46

2 June 1952

Capt. J. J. Rochefort  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Capt. Rochefort:

I have gone through everything we have here in an effort to find something on the refueling of the units mentioned in your letter of 26 May. None of the action reports has anything whatever on the subject, and some of the war diaries, which ought to contain such information, are likewise silent - that is, they make no specific mention of fueling. It is possible, of course, that a war diary entry like "prepared for sortie" or "made combat preparations" embraces fueling. Whatever the explanation, specific mentions of fueling are skimpy, indeed. The information that I did succeed in finding is given below.

1. BATDIVS 1, 2, 3: No specific data on fueling.

As you already know, War Diary BATDIV 1 (translated) says nothing. We have a war diary for MUSASHI, which also says nothing. There are no war diaries for YAMATO and NAGATO. There are also no war diaries for either BATDIV 2 or BATDIV 3, or for any of the component ships of these units. (There are action reports for KONGO & HARUNA, but these contain nothing on fueling.)

In War Diary BATDIV 1, however, I found one dispatch which should be of some help, though it is not very specific. Translation of this dispatch follows:

Date & Time of Dispatch:	2250 14 Oct
From:	C/S Second Fleet
To:	C/S Combined Fleet; Imp GHQ Navy Sec; C/S First Mobile Fleet; C/S Second Striking Force
Date & Time of Receipt:	0305 15 Oct

1. With the exception of the ships indicated below, the First Striking Force has completed battle preparations and is standing by at LINGGA. All ships at LINGGA are expected to complete fueling by evening 15 Oct.

a. Ships in drydock: NOSHIRO (leaves drydock 16 Oct); ISOKAZE (leaves drydock 15 Oct)

b. CRUDIV 16 will complete installation of radar gear at SINGAPORE on 15 Oct. AOBA is scheduled to enter drydock for propeller repair from 16 to 19 Oct (she can make 30 knots in her present condition). DESRON 2 (HAYASHIMO, AKISHIMO) are en route to MANILA.

(Rest of dispatch not given in document)

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2. CEUDIV #: No data available.

There is no war diary for this unit, nor for any of the component ships. There are action reports for ATAGO, MAYA and TAKAO, but none of these contains anything at all regarding fueling prior to the sortie from LINGGA.

3. DESRON 2: Data available only for NOSHIRO.

War Diary NOSHIRO, Oct 1944 gives the following information in entry for 17 Oct (at SINGAPORE): "Loaded 890 tons of fuel (full capacity)." After fueling, NOSHIRO left SINGAPORE at 0934 17 Oct for GARAN Anchorage. (War Diary NOSHIRO, Oct 1944, WDC 161636, NA 11973)

We have war diaries for two destroyers of DESRON 2 (KIYOSHIMO and AKISHIMO), but these make no specific mention of fueling. Kiyoshimo was at GARAN Anchorage from 1900 on 14 Oct until she sortied for BRUNEI at 0145 on the 18th. Entry for 16 Oct notes "preparations for sortie". AKISHIMO was at SINGAPORE from 1700 12 Oct to 1600 14 Oct, when she left for MANILA. She arrived outside MANILA Bay on the morning of the 17th but remained outside the harbor because the MANILA area was under air attack. While she was still cruising about waiting to enter the harbor, she received orders to proceed to BRUNEI and stand by. She therefore did not enter the harbor and headed for BRUNEI at 1030, arriving BRUNEI at 0930 19 Oct.

We have action reports for the above two destroyers and also for KISHINAMI (DESDIV 31), but as usual these contain nothing on fueling prior to sortie.

4. DESRON 10: Data given below for all ships except ISOKAZE.

I am aware that you did not ask about DESRON 10 and may therefore already have the information which follows. However, I am including it anyway. The information is given in two dispatches found in War Diary DESDIV 17, Oct 1944, WDC 161617, NA 11797. Translation follows:

Date & Time of Dispatch: 0615 15 Oct  
From: Flag, YAHAGI  
To: DESRON 10 (no time of receipt given)

Speedy refueling directed by 1YB SigOrd 169 will be carried out in accordance with the following, as soon as preparations are completed:

First refueling: NICHISHIO and ASAGUMO from starboard side of MUSASHI;  
YAMAGUMO and URAKAZE from port side of MUSASHI.

Second refueling: HAMAKAZE and YUKIKAZE from starboard side of MUSASHI;  
YAHAGI and NOWAKE from port side of MUSASHI.

Date & Time of Dispatch: 0830 15 Oct  
From: Flag, YAHAGI  
To: DESRON 10 (no time of receipt given)

0371

Change directions for second refueling as follows:  
YAHAGI and NOWAKE to refuel from starboard side of MUSASHI, and HAMAKAZE  
and YUKIKAZE from port side.

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Well, Captain, I'm afraid that that's all there is on the subject of fueling. I know that it is extremely spotty, but I trust that it will be of some help.

I note from our earlier translations of the CRUDIV 5 and CRUDIV 7 War Diaries that the ships of these units fueled at LINGGA on the 15th from HAYATOMO and FUKUAN MARU respectively. HAYATOMO, I recall, was shown as a COMBINED FLEET tanker on the 15 Aug organization table, which I recently sent up to you. Have you been able to find the FUKUAN MARU on the table?

Re your remark on the Commodore's desire for additional information on the Philippine air side between 17 and 22 October, please emphasize to the Commodore that I have already done everything that is available on the air operations all the way through the entire period of this study, that is, through 25-26 October. As I told you when you were down here, I have repeatedly combed the list of documents in the Archives and have actually gone through all documents where there was the slightest possibility of their containing something pertinent to the LEYTE battle. I am therefore fully confident that I have gotten everything there is to get in the Archives, and that any further searches for air documents there are useless. Our only hope is that the six documents which Roger has obtained from Capt Ohmæ on microfilm may contain some of the missing air data, especially for 5FGB, which was the principal air command involved in Philippine operations during the interim period in which the Commodore is now interested.

I hope that the Commodore was not annoyed by my letter of last week. It was a very difficult and painful letter to write, as it always is when discussing such matters. Please understand that I am not just trying to be obstreperous and grasping. I do have to consider my own interests and the well-being of my family.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami

0372

2 June 1952

Capt. J. J. Rochefort  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Capt. Rochefort:

I have gone through everything we have here in an effort to find something on the refueling of the units mentioned in your letter of 26 May. None of the action reports has anything whatever on the subject, and some of the war diaries, which ought to contain such information, are likewise silent - that is, they make no specific mention of fueling. It is possible, of course, that a war diary entry like "prepared for sortie" or "made combat preparations" embraces fueling. Whatever the explanation, specific mentions of fueling are skimpy, indeed. The information that I did succeed in finding is given below.

1. BATDIVS 1, 2, 3: No specific data on fueling.

As you already know, War Diary BATDIV 1 (translated) says nothing. We have a war diary for MUSASHI, which also says nothing. There are no war diaries for YAMATO and NAGATO. There are also no war diaries for either BATDIV 2 or BATDIV 3, or for any of the component ships of these units. (There are action reports for KONGO & HARUNA, but these contain nothing on fueling.)

In War Diary BATDIV 1, however, I found one dispatch which should be of some help, though it is not very specific. Translation of this dispatch follows:

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From:	C/S Second Fleet
To:	C/S Combined Fleet; Imp GHQ Navy Sec; C/S First Mobile Fleet; C/S Second Striking Force
Date & Time of Receipt:	0305 15 Oct

1. With the exception of the ships indicated below, the First Striking Force has completed battle preparations and is standing by at LINGGA. All ships at LINGGA are expected to complete fueling by evening 15 Oct.

a. Ships in drydock: NOSHIO (leaves drydock 16 Oct); ISOKAZE (leaves drydock 15 Oct)

b. CRUDIV 16 will complete installation of radar gear at SINGAPORE on 15 Oct. AOBA is scheduled to enter drydock for propeller repair from 16 to 19 Oct (she can make 30 knots in her present condition).

DESBON 2 (HAYASHIMO, AKISHIMO) are en route to MANILA.

(Rest of dispatch not given in document)

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2. CRUDIV 3: No data available.

There is no war diary for this unit, nor for any of the component ships. There are action reports for ATAGO, MAYA and TAKAO, but none of these contains anything at all regarding fueling prior to the sortie from LINGGA.

3. DESRON 2: Data available only for NOSHIRO.

War Diary NOSHIRO, Oct 1944 gives the following information in entry for 17 Oct (at SINGAPORE): "Loaded 890 tons of fuel (full capacity)." After fueling, NOSHIRO left SINGAPORE at 0934 17 Oct for GARAN Anchorage. (War Diary NOSHIRO, Oct 1944, WDC 161636, NA 11973)

We have war diaries for two destroyers of DESRON 2 (KIYOSHIMO and AKISHIMO), but these make no specific mention of fueling. Kiyoshimo was at GARAN Anchorage from 1900 on 14 Oct until she sortied for BRUNEI at 0145 on the 18th. Entry for 16 Oct notes "preparations for sortie". AKISHIMO was at SINGAPORE from 1700 12 Oct to 1600 14 Oct, when she left for MANILA. She arrived outside MANILA Bay on the morning of the 17th but remained outside the harbor because the MANILA area was under air attack. While she was still cruising about waiting to enter the harbor, she received orders to proceed to BRUNEI and stand by. She therefore did not enter the harbor and headed for BRUNEI at 1030, arriving BRUNEI at 0930 19 Oct.

We have action reports for the above two destroyers and also for KISHITANI (DESDIV 31), but as usual these contain nothing on fueling prior to sortie.

4. DESRON 10: Data given below for all ships except ISOKAZE.

I am aware that you did not ask about DESRON 10 and may therefore already have the information which follows. However, I am including it anyway. The information is given in two dispatches found in War Diary DESDIV 17, Oct 1944, WDC 161617, NA 11797. Translation follows:

Date & Time of Dispatch: 0615 15 Oct  
From: Flag, YAHAGI  
To: DESRON 10 (no time of receipt given)

Speedy refueling directed by 1YB SigOrd 169 will be carried out in accordance with the following, as soon as preparations are completed:

First refueling: MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO from starboard side of MUSASHI;  
YAMAGUMO and URAKAZE from port side of MUSASHI.  
Second refueling: HAMAKAZE and YUKIKAZE from starboard side of MUSASHI;  
YAHAGI and NOWAKE from port side of MUSASHI.

Date & Time of Dispatch: 0830 15 Oct  
From: Flag, YAHAGI  
To: DESRON 10 (no time of receipt given)

0374

Change directions for second refueling as follows:  
YAHAGI and NOMAKE to refuel from starboard side of MURASHI, and HAMAKAZE  
and YUKIKAZE from port side.

Well, Captain, I'm afraid that that's all there is on the subject of  
fueling. I know that it is extremely spotty, but I trust that it will be  
of some help.

I note from our earlier translations of the CRUDIV 5 and CRUDIV 7 War  
Diaries that the ships of these units fueled at LINGGA on the 15th from  
HAYATOMO and FUKUAN MARU respectively. HAYATOMO, I recall, was shown  
as a COMBINED FLEET tanker on the 15 Aug organization table, which I  
recently sent up to you. Have you been able to find the FUKUAN MARU on  
the table?

Re your remark on the Commodore's desire for additional information  
on the Philippine air side between 17 and 22 October, please emphasize  
to the Commodore that I have already done everything that is available  
on the air operations all the way through the entire period of this  
study, that is, through 25-26 October. As I told you when you were down  
here, I have repeatedly combed the list of documents in the Archives  
and have actually gone through all documents where there was the  
slightest possibility of their containing something pertinent to the  
LEITE battle. I am therefore fully confident that I have gotten everything  
there is to get in the Archives, and that any further searches for air  
documents there are useless. Our only hope is that the six documents  
which Rager has obtained from Capt Okuma on microfilm may contain some  
of the missing air data, especially for 5002, which was the principal air  
command involved in Philippine operations during the interim period  
in which the Commodore is now interested.

I hope that the Commodore was not annoyed by my letter of last week.  
It was a very difficult and painful letter to write, as it always is when  
discussing such matters. Please understand that I am not just trying  
to be obstreperous and grasping. I do have to consider my own interests  
and the well-being of my family.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami

0375

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 4 June 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

This is just to inform you that Roger returned from Tokyo last night. He immediately handed me the microfilm of material he obtained from Capt ORMAN for us, and I have just looked through it on the viewer. The film is extremely bad, and it will be impossible to translate any of it until it is blown-up and photostated. Some of it is so faint that it may not be legible even when photostated. Anyway, I'm sending it out for photostating right away.

All the stuff on the microfilm is air data, nothing on submarines. One part of it appears to be another part of our friend Capt SHINATA's diary notes, but they appear to be for the month of September. There did appear to be some items of October date, however. The rest of the stuff contains data on operations of some air groups involved in the TAIWAN and/or PHILIPPINES operations (221st and 141st of 2AF, 252nd of 3AF, and 203rd of 12AF). Some of this may be additional to what we already have, and therefore of value. However, the documents are not action reports or war diaries of air units, such as we

0376

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

- 2 -

DATE:

FROM :


SUBJECT:

have previously translated, but a sort of summary record of aircraft missions carried out during a given day, giving very little detail. I don't know just how useful the material will turn out to be.

I had specified that we most vitally needed material covering the IAF (5FGCB) air groups. I found that the microfilm contained some of the above type of records for the 201st Air Gp, but the latest date was 19 Sept. Roger said that OEHAE assured him that this was absolutely everything they had in Tokyo of the stuff that I asked for. I had also requested stuff on the 634th Air Gp, for which we have no documents, but apparently the Japanese have nothing on that either. It looks as though we're pretty much at a dead end so far as IAF, 634th Air Gp and the Army air operations are concerned.

I have just now received your manuscript and will go through it as soon as possible. Mr. Cassidy now has me sweating away on a job description for civil service, though what the outcome will be I don't know. Whether I can continue or not, of course, will hinge upon the rating which they offer me. Did you give any indication to Cassidy as to what rating you thought I should get?

Sincerely,



0377

Answer for Kawakami san

1. The <sup>attached</sup> answer was compiled by Ohmae on the bases of the following materials after careful evaluation of them.

Statement of Adm. Toyoda, C-in-C, Combined Fleet

" Adm. Ozawa, C-in-C, Mobile Fleet

" Adm. Takata, Deputy Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet

Personal Record of Capt. Shibata, Senior Staff, 2nd Air Fleet

" Comdr. Sawashima, Air Staff, Cardiv 4

Comdr. Ito, Air Staff, Mobile Fleet and Cardiv 3

(2. ~~As about signal abbreviation, answers will be sent later.~~)

Query for Capt. Ohmori:

We have here the SENTO SHOKO of 653rd Air Group covering the SHO Operation, 20-25 Oct 1944. This document gives a breakdown of the aircraft on the CARDIV 3 carriers as follows:

Fighters - 52  
Fighter-bombers - 28  
SUISHI - 7  
TENZAN - 25  
Type-97 attack - 4  
Total - 116 planes

Carrier	Fighters	Fighter-Bombers	SUISHI	TENZAN	Type-97 Attack	Total
ZUIKAKU	28	16	7	14	0	65
ZUIHO	8	4	0	5	0	17
CHITOSE	8	4	0	6	0	18
CHITODA	8	4	0	0	4	16
					<u>Total</u>	<u>116</u>

In this table there are some parenthetical insertions; as follows:

After the figure 28 in the fighter column - (161.1sf)  
After the figure 7 in the SUSHI column - (1sf)  
After the figure 4 in the Type-97 attack column - (931 fg)

I take these to indicate that the 28 fighters on ZUIKAKU included aircraft of the 161st Fighter Unit, 601st Air Gp; that the 7 SUSHI on ZUIKAKU were also from 601st Air Gp, and that the 4 Type-97 attack planes on CHITODA included aircraft of the 931st Air Gp.

Another document we have here (War Diary of 601st Air Gp ZUIKAKU HAKENTAI) indicates that 16 Zero fighters, 7 SUSHI, 2 TENZAN and 2 Type-97 attack planes of the 601st Air Gp were included in the air strength on CARDIV 3 when it sortied for the LEYTE battle.

What I would like to find out is whether the table above, totalling 116 planes, represents all the planes that OZAWA had on his carriers for the sortie. The Sento Shoko of the Mobile Force Main Body also gives this figure, 116, and I am fairly certain that it represents the total number of aircraft, exclusive of OYODO's two search planes.

If 116

is the total number of planes, then the above table presumably includes whatever CARDIV 4 aircraft (634th Air Gp) were transferred to CARDIV 3 for the sortie, although the table above doesn't contain any notations indicating what planes, if any, were from 634th Air Gp. I would like to find out, if possible, whether there were any 634th Air Gp planes on CARDIV 3 in this operation, and if so, approximately how many. We unfortunately have not been able to find any documents whatever of the 634th Air Gp for this period.

I would further like to know if the 601st and 634th Air Gp planes which joined CARDIV 3 for this operation came under command of the 653rd Air Gp commander, or if not, what the command arrangements were.

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Query for Capt. Ohmas, Cont'd

There are a few other points I would like to ask about in connection with the transfer of CARDIV 3 and CARDIV 4 (653rd and 634th Air Gps) aircraft to 6FGF command on 12 October to operate from land bases in the TAIWAN Air Battle.

(1) Was the Combined Fleet order directing this transfer (GF DENREI SAKU 344, 1110 12 Oct) issued from Hiogo by the Chief of Staff? Did he consult TOYODA on this matter, or was it his own decision? Of course, two days earlier, at 1019 10 Oct, there had been a Combined Fleet order (DENREI SAKU 334) directing CARDIVS 3 and 4 to prepare all their operational aircraft for land-based operations. So the transfer was already contemplated on the 10th. What I am anxious to find out is where did this idea originate - with TOYODA or with Combined Fleet Hq and the Naval General Staff in Tokyo? If it was not TOYODA'S idea to begin with, did he approve of it? Was he notified of the first Combined Fleet order issued on the 10th?

(2) GF DENREI SAKU 344, 12 Oct, stated: "Comdr, First Mobile Fleet will place the full strength of CARDIV 3 and 4 air units capable of land-based operations under tactical command of Comdr, 6FGF." As given in ZUIKAKU War Diary, this order is phrased "KICHI SAKUSEN KANO (航セハ) ZENRYOKU ...." What does the part in parentheses mean? Also, what exactly does "KICHI SAKUSEN KANO" mean in this case? I suppose that, at this time, not all the aircraft of CARDIVS 3 and 4 were yet adequately trained for carrier-based operations. But practically their full operational strength must have been able to operate from land bases, wasn't it? So doesn't this order actually mean that Comdr First Mobile Fleet (OZAWA) should release all operational aircraft of CARDIVS 3 and 4 to 6FGF?

However, in fact, I found a 2AF dispatch of 12 Oct which indicated that a total of 83 planes were released to 6FGF from CARDIV 3, and 71 from CARDIV 4. Now these figures are definitely not the full operational strength of these two air groups. War Diary 653rd Air Gp, Oct 1944 shows that on 1 October this air group had a total of 103 planes of combat types. The document does not make clear whether this figure is the total number of aircraft or just operational planes, but I presume that it is the number of operational aircraft (JITSUDOKI) on 1 Oct. Unfortunately, as I said earlier, I have no documents giving the strength of 634th Air Gp at this time. The only strength figure we have for the 634th Air Gp is 101 operational aircraft as of 15 September (this information was obtained from Tokyo). Anyway, here too, it would seem that the operational strength of 634th Air Gp on 12 Oct must have been more than the 71 planes which it released to 6FGF.

It therefore seems that, actually, about 80% of CARDIV 3 operational aircraft were transferred for land-based operations, and about 70% of CARDIV 4 operational aircraft. (Most of the planes withheld were fighters.) I would like to find out, if possible, why CARDIVS 3 and 4 did not release all their operational planes. Were some aircraft not able to operate from land bases, and if so, why? Or did OZAWA deliberately withhold some of the planes because he was reluctant to deprive CARDIVS 3 and 4 of their aircraft?

Will appreciate any help you can give me in regard to these matters.

0380



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 47

12 June 1952

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I am forwarding herewith a couple of items which Roger brought back from Tokyo, and which will be of interest to you in connection with the "Orange Side" MSS now in my hands.

The first item is Roger's memo of a verbal statement made to him by Admiral Toyoda regarding the vital question of who decided the activation of SHO 1 and 2 for the base air forces only. Unfortunately, since Roger was not familiar with the circumstances, he put the question rather badly. Be that as it may, Toyoda's answer is highly interesting in that it differs rather sharply from the impression given in his book. It does repeat what he said in the book to the effect that it was Adm KUSAKA, Combined Fleet Chief of Staff at HIYOSHI, who took the initiative and asked Toyoda (whether by radio or by telephone is not clear) if orders should be issued to activate the SHO Operations for the base air forces. However, whereas Toyoda said in his book that he instructed KUSAKA to decide the matter and issue necessary orders after consulting with the Naval General Staff, Toyoda told Roger that the decision was his own. According to Roger's memo, Toyoda said that he himself issued the order, but I daresay that what he meant by this was that he instructed KUSAKA to issue the order in his (Toyoda's) name from HIYOSHI Hq.

In connection with the above, one important point that remains unclear is exactly when was it that KUSAKA consulted Toyoda - before he issued the alert order on the 10th or before he issued the activation order on the 12th. I note that you have treated it in the MSS as occurring on the latter date, and perhaps you have some interrogation statements which I do not have and which tend to point to the 12th rather than the 10th. I have hitherto felt, in the absence of any clearcut evidence, that it must have occurred on the 10th rather than the 12th. It seems more logical to me that KUSAKA would have consulted Toyoda at the very start, before issuing the alert order, rather than waiting until the 12th. I also got the impression from what Toyoda said in his book that he got the query from KUSAKA on the 10th, although it is true that the specific time is not mentioned and that the passage speaks of "activation" rather than just "alert". I don't think that the use of the word "activation" here should be construed as pinning it down to the 12th rather than the 10th. The impression I get from Toyoda's statement in the book is that KUSAKA was asking his authorization to apply the whole policy of activating the SHO Operations for the base air forces only, involving both an immediate alert order and a later activation order if developments confirmed its advisability. This would, necessarily, have been on the 10th.

*most probably, though not*

0381

too /

*Right*

This point, however, is not/vital in view of the accumulating evidence that the actions of alerting and activating the SHO Operations for the base air forces only, as well as of committing the carrier force aircraft to shore-based operations if they were not yet ready for carrier operations, conformed to plans formulated by Combined Fleet prior to Toyoda's departure ~~from Tokyo~~ from Tokyo on his inspection trip. You have, I think, made this quite clear in your manuscript. Hence, Toyoda in any event must bear responsibility for the general policy. Furthermore, even if he had not been consulted by Kusaka before Combined Fleet Hq issued the alert order for Sho 2 on 10 Oct, Toyoda most definitely indicated his sanction of the application of the above policy by himself issuing the order from SHINCHIKU a few hours later, extending the alert to SHO 1.

*Combined Fleet*

*agree*

In this connection, I was very happy to note that you now have a clearcut explanation in your MSS to the effect that the activation of the SHO Operations for the base air forces only, ~~was~~ while envisaged in the basic SHO plan under certain circumstances, was in fact a minor deviation from the basic SHO concept of committing all forces at once and only against an enemy amphibious landing force. I think it would be well to go still farther and make it plain also that this deviation was a Combined Fleet or Navy policy only, affecting only the Navy air forces. The Army had no similar provision to activate the SHO Operations for the Army air forces only, and as I mentioned to you some months back, Imperial General Headquarters Army Section, upon specific recommendations by Field Marshal Terauchi in September urging that Fourth Air Army be authorized to attack raiding enemy task forces, had only agreed to a limited relaxation of the basic SHO policy, permitting 4FA to assign a small part of its strength to hit-and-run attacks on enemy task forces under particularly favorable conditions. So, the TAIWAN air battle was a purely Navy show, ordered by the Navy alone and affecting only Navy forces (the Army air forces on TAIWAN and OKINAWA being under Navy command). 5FGB, of course, was also committed by the simultaneous activation of SHO 1 for the base air forces. But Fourth Air Army was not affected. It merely acted in support of 5FGB with a portion of its strength within the framework of the 5FGB-4FA local agreement concerning joint action against enemy task forces prior to SHO activation. This, it seems to me, is a very important point, which does not clearly come out in your discussion.

*No!*

*agree*

I think your treatment of this matter would be clearer if you referred only to the Imperial General Headquarters central Army-Navy agreements and directives as "the basic SHO plan". These instruments, as you know, made no provision for a partial activation of the operations for the air forces only. The deviation came in the implementing plans drawn up by Combined Fleet and affecting Navy forces only (it was presumably in Combined Fleet OpOrds 83 and 85, though our only evidence is in Mobile Force OpOrd 76). This points up a weakness of the Japanese command system even greater than you have pictured it. For it means that ~~the~~ Imperial General Headquarters (or, more accurately speaking, the Army and Navy Sections of Imp. GHQ acting jointly by central agreement) could adopt a basic coordinated plan affecting ground, sea and air forces. Then, the Navy operational command -

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Combined Fleet, wielding more power often than the Naval General Staff - could come along and throw the basic coordinated plan into a cocked hat by providing for an employment of its own forces, in certain special circumstances to be sure, that would nullify the top-level plan. This is independence of the fighting services carried to a ridiculous extreme; yet, such was the independent authority exercised in this instance by Combined Fleet.

To get back to the subject of this letter, however, the second item I am forwarding is a statement ~~pre~~ prepared by Capt OHMAE in reply to some queries I drew up and asked Roger to get the answers to, relative to the transfer of CARDIV 3 and 4 aircraft to 2AF for shore-based operations. OHMAE lists his sources on a covering sheet, and you will note that he had access to "personal records" of the Air Staff Officers of CARDIVS 3 and 4, in addition to others. It is too bad that he couldn't send us these records themselves, rather than a secondary statement based on them. However, he does provide us with some new information of value. Since it bears on the background period, I had Mrs. T translate it right away, so that you may proceed to make whatever corrections it necessitates in your manuscript. There are several important points:

1. The training of the CARDIV 3 air units was behind schedule, so that, as of just before the TAIWAN air battle, they would not reach full readiness for daytime carrier operations by mid-October, as previously planned, but only by sometime in November. This, of course, was an all-important factor influencing the decision on 12 Oct to use the carrier aircraft in shore-based operations. OHMAE says that the transfer was in accordance with a plan previously adopted informally (NAITEI, literally meaning "internally decided") by Combined Fleet to meet the eventuality of an enemy task force attack before the carrier air units were ready to operate from the carriers. Hence, this, too, was "according to plan". You have already indicated in your MSS that there was a plan for using the carrier air groups in shore-based operations in certain circumstances. This merely elucidates what these circumstances were.

2. Mobile Fleet, it appears, did question the transfer order and was assured that Combined Fleet did not intend to use the carrier force.

3. Although the order called for the transfer of all CARDIV 3 and 4 aircraft capable of shore-based operation - and OHMAE acknowledges that this meant practically every operational plane they had - he indicates that, as a result of telephone consultations between Combined Fleet and Mobile Fleet Hq, it was agreed that CARDIV 3 would keep back a small number of the best fliers to carry on training, as well as the least-trained. CARDIV 4, he says, was to transfer everything it had. ~~As regards the number of planes transferred, OHMAE comes up with figures in excess of those we used on the basis of 2nd Staff Dispatch 127556. The only explanation I can see is that this dispatch covered only the aircraft to be immediately transferred. For CARDIV 4, OHMAE gives a total of 31 as against the 71 shown in the dispatch, those 31 all transferred by the afternoon of 14 Oct. It indicates that all remaining aircraft of~~ *may have*

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ok 4. As regards the actual numbers of planes transferred, OHMAE's statement isn't very clear, but the data he has put down on p. 5 of the pencil translation (plus supplementary remarks on pp. 8-10) appear to add up to larger numbers of aircraft transferred than the figures given in 2AF Senior Staff Officer Dispatch 121536. This dispatch gave a total of 83 aircraft from CARDIV 3, and 71 from CARDIV 4. OHMAE, however, comes up with a total of 124 planes from CARDIV 3 between 13 and 17 Oct; and for CARDIV 4, he gives 81 transferred up to the afternoon of 14 Oct, in addition to which he claims that additional aircraft (number unspecified) moved up to TAIWAN and the PHILIPPINES after the 14th, so that finally the entire strength of CARDIV 4 was engaged in land-based operations under 2AF.

(89 see dispatch was Dmy 103 after the hunt Oct 12).

Personally, I am hesitant about accepting OHMAE's figures as more reliable than our own. In the first place, the 2AF Staff Officer dispatch, referred to above, contains no internal evidence of being limited to ~~an~~ initial transfers of CARDIV 3 and 4 aircraft, with further transfers to take place later. It sounds more as if the figures there given represent all the aircraft to be transferred. Second, OHMAE's figure of 81 planes for CARDIV 4 so closely resembles our 71 that it suggests the possibility of a mere error in addition somewhere along the line. (OHMAE'S breakdown by types does add up to 81 all right, but there could be errors in his computation of the numbers of each type. He has 8 more fighters than we do, and 2 more ZUIUN seaplane bombers.) As to his contention that further CARDIV 4 aircraft were gradually transferred from the 14th on, he could very well be right, ~~but~~ There is no way of checking here, for we have no 634 Air Gp documents. As regards his figures for 653 Air Gp (CARDIV 3), I think they are definitely questionable. We do have documents for 653, and they say nothing about OHMAE's Item D - regarding 41 additional CARDIV 3 planes which moved up from OITA to Formosa on the 17th. Now, if you exclude this one item and add up the figures OHMAE gives in B and C, you will find that they total 83 planes, which agrees with the figure we have for the number of CARDIV 3 aircraft to be transferred to 2AF. Further, the figures by types agree exactly for fighters and fighter-bombers and for SUISEL-TENZAN lumped together. In view of this, my own opinion is that our 83 figure for CARDIV 3 is right, and that OHMAE is in error about 41 more planes moving up to TAIWAN on the 17th. I would like to know where he got this information, and take a look at it myself. Presumably his source was the "personal record" of Comdr ITO, CARDIV 3 Staff Officer for Air.

5. OHMAE indicates that no 634 Air Gp (CARDIV 4) planes were aboard CARDIV 3 when the Mobile Force Main Body sortied. This fits in with the table given in 653 Air Gp Det Ac Rep, which gives the breakdown of aircraft aboard the four carriers and ~~shows~~ indicates aircraft from 601 Air Gp (CARDIV 1) and 931st Air Gp but shows none coming from 634. It doesn't jibe so well with Comdr Mobile Force's DesOpOrd No. 10 (Dispatch 171625), which added 634 Air Gp planes still at OITA and KAGOSHIMA bases and capable of carrier operations to the air strength already allotted to CARDIV 3 for the sortie. It seems strange that Mobile Fleet Hq would issue such an order unless it had knowledge that there were still some 634 Air Gp planes left at OITA and KAGOSHIMA. On the other hand, it is quite possible that ~~SHARPE~~ the order

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simply couldn't be executed, either because what 634 Air Gp planes ~~were~~ remained weren't operable or because they weren't capable of carrier operations.

If no CARDIV 4 aircraft were taken aboard for the sortie, then all the planes except the 27 from CARDIV 1 and 2 from 931 Air Gp must have been 653 Air Gp planes. There were 116 aboard altogether, which means that 87 then were from 653 Air Gp. I previously figured (refer to CHK No. 44, 1 Apr) that only some 23 of the 83 planes originally transferred from 653 Air Gp to 2AF remained in the homeland on the 17th. That leaves 54 which must have been aircraft withheld by CARDIV 3 when the transfer was made. You will recall, in this connection, that the only strength figure that I could find for the 653rd Air Gp was 103 combat-type aircraft on 1 Oct. The document failed to indicate whether ~~this was~~ this was total strength or just operational aircraft. However, in the light of the above new data, it is quite clear that the 103 figure was just the number of planes operational as of 1 Oct. (OHMAE says this, too.) The total number of aircraft must have been in the neighborhood of 140 (that is, 83 plus 54). OHMAE further surmises that the 103 figure represents only the CARDIV 3 main strength at OITA Base as of 1 Oct, and does not include some SUISEI and TENZAN which were training at KAGOSHIMA. All I can say on this is that the 653 Air Gp War Diary gives the strength on 1 Oct as 103 planes, without any indication that this figure represents only the strength at OITA Base.

OHMAE further adds to the confusion by his statement that, as of the first ten days of October, CARDIV 3 had 90% of its allotted aircraft strength of 192 planes of all types. If this is true, CARDIV 3 should have had some 170 planes in all (including aircraft in immediate reserve). This is 30 more than the 140 I got above (by working backward), although if the reserve aircraft are excluded, the numbers would be pretty close.

6. Minor points:

a. The authorized complements of the CARDIVS which OHMAE gives on p. 2 jibe with those I provided you from the 15 Aug 1944 Navy Table of Organization, except for CARDIV 4, to which OHMAE has added 24 carrier attack planes. I looked at the table again and found that there was a hand-written insertion in the carrier attack plane column of 18/6, the 18 being full operating complement and the 6 being planes in immediate reserve. This indicates that, subsequent to 15 Aug, the CARDIV 4 complement was increased as OHMAE indicates. OHMAE's figures lump together the operating complements and reserve aircraft. OHMAE's note following the complements on p. 2 baffles me completely, since ZUIKAKU was transferred from CARDIV 1 to CARDIV 3 on 10 Aug, not 1 Sept, and as far as I know, it was part of a permanent reorganization of the carrier divisions, not a temporary transfer. The aircraft complements shown on the 15 Aug table, consequently, ought to in conformity with the 10 Aug reorganization.

b. On p. 10, OHMAE gives the 15 Sept strength figures for CARDIVS 3 and 4, obviously taken from the SHIBATA papers which were sent to us earlier. The figures for CARDIV 3 are identical with SHIBATA's down to the

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error in the total. OHMAE's CARDIV 4 figures, however, appear to clear up the error in SHIBATA's figures as we previously received them. When they copied SHIBATA's table for us before, they must simply have made a typographical error which no one caught and corrected. So it might be well for you to correct the CARDIV 4 column in the SHIBATA table in accordance with OHMAE's figures. These figures show that CARDIV 4, as of 15 Sept, had a total of 112 aircraft of all types, of which 71 were operational.

So much for all that.

Thank you for your letter of the 10th, received yesterday. Your kind and laudatory representations to Cassidy were unquestionably effective, for he did everything he could to satisfy me. Admiral Hartman has approved a GS-12 middle-bracket rating carrying an annual pay of \$7,440. I presume that the thing will now go through all right on that basis.

Will send you SHIBATA's diary and also the pictures Roger brought back for you. He says to tell you that they are his gift to you from his trip.

I have read through a good portion of the MSS and will do my best to get it back to you by the 18th. Let me say that I am quite amazed at the wonderful job you have done in tying together the confusing mass of air operations material. The preliminary portions also are in much better shape now than the earlier manuscript I went through. I continue to feel, as I pointed out before, that the description of the command system is not entirely accurate, and I shall have some comments to make on other points.

The microfilms Roger brought back have been photostated now and are fortunately much more legible than I thought they would be. As I mentioned before, there is a little material in them bearing on the TAIWAN air operations. However, if I am to get through your MSS before the 18th, I hesitate to put it aside in order to work on this material. Let me know if you would prefer that I work on the microfilm first, for the sake of getting this material up there before Hartman's departure, and leave my comments on the MSS till later.

Sincerely,

  
Clarke H. Kawakami

0386

Memorandum to C. H. Kawakami from R. Pineau

9 June 1952

Subject: Activation of the Sho Go Operation for Base Air Force.

On 23 May 1952 in conversation with Admiral Soemu Toyoda I asked where the decision had been made to activate the SHO Go Operation for the Base Air Forces; whether it was a decision made by himself alone or whether it had come as an order from Tokyo for him to execute.

His answer was unequivocal. In Formosa, where he was at the time, communications with the homeland were very bad. He received no instructions or orders from the homeland about activation of the operation for the Base Air Forces.

His Chief of Staff, Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, made the suggestion to him that it might be a good idea to activate the operation first for the Base Air Forces, and, after careful consideration, he (Toyoda) came to the decision that this was sound and himself ordered accordingly.

R. Pineau

0387

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates

DATE: 17 June 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

This is to inquire if it is all right for me to hold on to your MSS for a few days more, if possible, till the end of the week. As you know, the business with Civil Service prevented ~~me~~ from getting to work on it immediately, and I haven't been able to get through it yet and write down my comments. However, I don't like to hold up HARTMAN's departure, so if you wish, I will send it back immediately with what comments I have already done. Please let me know.

Sincerely,

CHK

0388

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 18 June 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT: Job Description

I am forwarding herewith two copies of my job description, which require your signature in Item 13, on both copies. I have to return these to Cassidy's office in connection with my transfer to Civil Service.

I trust that you will not find the job description overly exaggerative of my role in the project. I endeavored to make it as accurate as I could, and at the same time provide adequate basis for a decent rating outside the abhorred translator classification. Hence, the stress given to the planning, supervisory, *research* and consultative aspects of the job - all of which are, I think, quite true and vital. It is on the basis of this description that Cassidy's office has agreed to a GS-12 rating as historian. I hope you will view the description in this light.

Sincerely,

CHK

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 48

June 20, 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

Yesterday morning I received your letter of the 17th asking for proof of my contention that activation of the SHO Operations for the base air forces was a Navy deviation from the basic SHO plan, and that the Army air forces were not involved. In view of the importance of this point to the discussion in the portion of your MSS which I am presently reviewing, I felt that I had best set aside the MSS for a day or two in order to research this particular matter further and provide you with the best possible documentation. So I spent yesterday at the Army Historical Division going through their Japanese army material. Though information is lacking on some points, all the evidence, I believe, supports my contention, and I think that I can convince you that it does. Let me, therefore, take up the questions you pose, one by one.

(a) Do we know that the Imperial GHQ basic plan did not include authority for activation of the SHO Operations for the air forces only?

*(it did)*  
Answer: Very clearly and definitely *not*. This is already fully documented, for the basic plan of SHO air operations, covering both Army and Navy air forces, was the Central Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Sho Air Operations, 24 July 1944, which you have. This was implemented, for the Navy, by Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Directive No. 435, 26 July, addressed to CinC Combined Fleet. The directive simply stated that air operations in the SHO Operations would be based on the Central Agreement, and the agreement itself was appended to the directive as a supplement. As we have a complete file of Imperial GHQ Navy Section Orders and Directives, we further know that there was no subsequent order or directive from the Navy Section (and remember that this also means the Naval General Staff) modifying the air policies stipulated in the Central Agreement. Consequently, the proviso for activating the SHO Operations for the base air forces only, providing a particularly favorable opportunity arose to destroy the enemy's carrier forces by air action alone, can only have been introduced on the command level below Imperial GHQ Navy Section, that is, Combined Fleet. Presumably, it appeared in Combined Fleet OpOrd 83 or 85, although it very curiously does not appear in OpOrd 86 where one would expect to find it as this order specifically covers the employment of the naval air forces in the SHO Operations. (OpOrd 86 follows exactly the stipulations of the Central Agreement). In any case, since Mobile Force OpOrd 76, 10 Aug, refers briefly to possible activation for the base air forces only, Combined Fleet must have issued some directive covering this matter prior to 10 Aug. (I use the word "directive", because there is a possibility that it was not in OpOrd 83 or 85, just as it wasn't in OpOrd

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86, and that it was never issued in any official written Combined Fleet order at all. It could have been circulated to the subordinate commands concerned as a directive or instruction, perhaps verbal in staff conferences, supplementary to the written operations orders.) In any case, there can be little doubt that the policy originated with Combined Fleet and, as such, was a policy affecting the naval air forces only.

So much for the Navy side. What about the Army? Here again, of course, the basic plan is the Central Air Agreement of 24 July, and the procedure of implementation was the same as for the Navy, viz., the Army Section of Imperial GHQ issued a directive stating that air operations would be in accordance with the Central Agreement, which was appended to the directive as a supplement. Unfortunately, the file of Army Section Orders and Directives available in Army Hist Div is not a complete one, and this particular directive is missing. However, 1st Demobilization Bureau Monograph, History of Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters (Army Hist Div File No. 8-5, JS-72), refers to the directive and the Central Agreement in terms which plainly confirm that the Army and Navy Section directives were identical in their stipulation that air operations would follow the provisions of the Central Agreement. That this was so beyond all possibility of doubt will emerge more clearly below in the discussion of Southern Army's implementation of the Army Section directive.

To sum up the answer to (a), then, the directives regarding air operations which were issued by Imperial GHQ Navy Section to CinC Combined Fleet and by Imperial GHQ Army Section to CinC Southern Army both stipulated that air operations would be in accordance with the Central Agreement. There was no provision, whatever, for a possible activation of the SHO Operations for the air forces only. This brings us to

(b) Do we know that the Army SHO plan corresponding to the Combined Fleet SHO plan did not provide for activation for air only?

Answer: The corresponding Army plan would be the plan of operations drawn up and issued by Southern Army headquarters early in August, in implementation of Army Section directives. I know from my research in Tokyo that the original text of this document was nowhere available. However, 1st Demobilization Bureau Monograph, Southern Army Operations, 1941-45 (Army Hist Div File No. 8-5, JS-21), discusses the plan very briefly. Unfortunately, this discussion deals exclusively with the employment of the Philippine ground forces, and it fails to say anything about what the plan contained with respect to 4th Air Army operations. Nevertheless, later developments explained below will establish, I think, that the air portion of this Southern Army plan must have conformed precisely to the policies stipulated in the Central Air Agreement. (Incidentally, the 1st Demob Bureau Monograph on Fourth Air Army Operations, 1941-45, which you already have, makes no mention whatever of the Southern Army plan.)

Proof of the above statement is provided by action which Southern Army Headquarters took in mid-September, more than one month after the issuance of its operations plan of early August. As already pointed out in some earlier

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comments of mine (please refer to CHK No. 36, 25 Jan 1952, last paragraph on p. 7 and top of p. 8), Southern Army Headquarters, at the time of the early September carrier strikes on the southern and central Philippines, was so deeply concerned over their effectiveness, particularly the serious losses inflicted on Japanese Army and Navy aircraft at their bases, that Field Marshal Terauchi sent his Operations Officer, Colonel Yozo Miyama, to Tokyo to present some urgent policy recommendations to the Army Section of Imperial GHQ. One recommendation was for the prompt activation of SHO I by Imperial GHQ, on the ground that enemy invasive action against the Philippines was imminent. The second was for a modification of the Central Agreement air policies so as to authorize employment of Fourth Air Army strength in attack operations against raiding enemy task forces. Quoted below is exactly what the monograph on Southern Army Operations says regarding this demarche (quotation is from the badly-translated English version, but it is clear enough):

"Because Southern Army expected enemy attacks in the near future, they sent Colonel Miyama, chief of the Operations Section, to Tokyo to report on the first enemy air raids (T.N.- in September) and to report on the progress of defenses for the Philippines. .... The following important matters were presented to Imperial General Headquarters at that time:

"a. It is necessary to put the SHO No. 1 Operation in action at once and move the necessary troops. Since positive enemy attacks are expected in the very near future, the success of the SHO No. 1 Operation depends upon its timely commencement.

\*\*\*\*\*

"b. Attacks on enemy task forces by the air force (T.N. - Army) must be approved. Imperial General Headquarters wants to withhold the air force in spite of attacks by enemy task forces until the time of a landing. This is disadvantageous for the SHO No. 1 Operation. If enemy task force operations are checked in their early stage, we can ~~fully execute~~ freely carry out our future plans, at the same time disrupting the enemy's plans.

"Imperial General Headquarters replied as follows:

"a. As for commencement of the SHO No. 1 Operation, we are doing our best to complete preparations in the near future.

"b. Attacks against enemy task forces are not sure to succeed. Moreover, it may decrease our strength and interfere with the combined operations at the time of an enemy landing. Attacks on enemy task forces, therefore, cannot be approved. However, we have no objection if elements of the air force (T.N. - Army) take opportune moments to carry out attacks." (End quote)

Now, the second of the above recommendations by Southern Army conclusively establishes two things. First, it confirms the point made earlier that the Imperial GHQ Army Section directive to CinC Southern Army in July conformed precisely to the Central Agreement respecting air operations, and further that Imperial General Headquarters Army Section had not only not modified this original directive up to mid-September but now refused to modify it except to a very minor degree. Second, it proves that Southern Army, both in its

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implementing operations plan of early August and subsequently thereto, had faithfully adhered to the air policies of the Central Agreement and not authorized any offensive action by Fourth Air Army against merely raiding enemy task forces prior to an invasion. At the same time, it proves that Southern Army, unlike Combined Fleet, recognized that it lacked the authority to permit any departure from the Central Agreement policies by the air forces under its command (Fourth Air Army) without the express sanction of Imperial General Headquarters Army Section.

6939  
It necessarily follows from the above that there was, on the Army side, no authorization anywhere for a limited activation of the SHO Operations for air alone paralleling the Combined Fleet policy. By its very recommendation to Imperial GHQ Army Section, Southern Army recognized that it was not authorized to take such action. And Imperial GHQ Army Section, by its reply, showed that it had no intention of granting such authority. It agreed to relax the Central Agreement stipulations to the extent that Fourth Air Army would be permitted henceforth to carry out small-scale attacks on enemy task forces in specially favorable situations. It was undoubtedly under this relaxation that the second local agreement between Fourth Air Army and First Air Fleet, regarding joint action against enemy task forces prior to SHO activation, was concluded. But there was still to be no full-scale commitment of Fourth Air Army strength until an enemy invasion and the full activation of SHO 1 by Imperial GHQ.

Why it was that Combined Fleet was able to make an exception to the Central Agreement with respect to the employment of the naval air forces, whereas Southern Army was not able to do the same for the Army air forces, becomes a little less difficult to understand if you consider the following points. (1) It had always been, and still remained under the Central Agreement, the Navy's primary responsibility to deal with enemy task forces. Navy fliers were trained for over-water operations against enemy carriers and other combat ships; Army fliers were not. Under the Central Agreement, the primary mission of the Army air forces ~~was~~ in the SHO Operations was to be the destruction of enemy transports at the point of landing. This means that, under the Central Agreement, the Army air forces were barred from offensive action against enemy task forces not only by the principle of conserving air strength until an enemy invasion (which applied to the Navy as well), but also by the mission assigned to them, namely the destruction of enemy transports. Quite obviously, if the Army air forces expended their strength in offensive action against enemy task forces before a landing, they would become incapable of fulfilling their primary mission.

(2) On the contrary, the Navy's ultimate mission in the SHO Operations was to be the destruction of the enemy task forces. The Central Agreement laid down the fundamental principle of conserving air strength until an enemy invasion, it is true, but Combined Fleet, while accepting that as the general policy, foresaw special circumstances in which it might achieve its mission in advance by the timely employment of its full air strength against enemy task forces. Hence, the Combined Fleet provision for activating the SHO Operations for the base air forces only, in case a favorable opportunity presented itself to destroy the enemy task forces by air action alone. This was, in fact, far less unreasonable than it appears. For Combined

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Fleet naturally considered the accomplishment of its mission the paramount thing, rather than the method. It undoubtedly calculated that, if circumstances arose in which this mission could be performed by air action alone in advance of an enemy invasion, it would be far better than waiting for the invasion itself and the full activation of SHO by Imperial GHQ. In fact, if the destruction of the enemy's carrier forces were successfully achieved in this manner, the ~~invading~~ enemy would have to defer invasion operations, and the Japanese would have further much-needed time to strengthen their defensive preparations. Thus, Combined Fleet undoubtedly thought this exception to the conservation-of-air-strength principle fully justified, as well as within its sphere of competence as a matter of the tactical employment of ~~Imperial~~ Combined Fleet forces.

In any case, you now have the answer to your query (b). It is: yes, we do know that the Army SHO plan corresponding to the Combined Fleet SHO plan did not provide for activation for air only. This brings us to your point (c), which raises the question whether Fourth Air Army participation in the attacks carried out from the Philippines during the Taiwan air battle does not constitute evidence that there was an Army air activation paralleling that of the Navy.

Answer: (1) There very definitely was no such activation on the Imperial General Headquarters level, for the file of Imperial GHQ Army Section Orders and Directives in Army Hist Div is complete from 22 Aug 1944 on, and no order or directive of this nature was issued to CinC Southern Army. I might add that it would have been highly curious if there had been such an order, for it would have reversed the stand taken by the Army Section in September vis-à-vis the Southern Army recommendations.

(2) As for Southern Army, all available evidence points to the conclusion that it ordered no activation for Army air either. As previously mentioned, there is no available file of Southern Army orders, and the best source we have is the 1st Demobilization Bureau monograph, Southern Army Operations, 1944-45. This document makes no mention whatever of any action by Southern Army to activate SHO 1 for the Army air forces in conjunction with Combined Fleet's activation for the Navy air forces. This silence seems pretty conclusive, particularly taken in conjunction with what this document had to say concerning the Southern Army recommendations of mid-September and Imperial GHQ Army Section's reply thereto. To bolster this negative evidence, the 1st Demobilization Bureau monograph, Fourth Air Army Operations, 1944-45, likewise fails to mention any activation of SHO 1 for Army air. It seems highly improbable that the monograph would fail to mention such an activation if there had been one.

(3) Thus, in the absence of any activation order from higher Army headquarters, Fourth Air Army unquestionably acted within the framework of the second local agreement between itself and First Air Fleet (the agreement concerning joint action against enemy task forces prior to SHO activation) and also in accordance with its own draft plan for operations after mid-October. Both the agreement and the draft plan, you will recall, provided for employment of the full fighter strength of Fourth Air Army to provide cover and strafing support for the Navy's attack units, and

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they also provided for small-scale hit-and-run attacks by Fourth Air Army planes operating alone. Specifically, the 27th Air Regt was authorized, at the discretion of its commander, to execute surprise attacks, employing small units of 1-3 aircraft. ~~It~~ It is more than just a coincidence that the 27th Air Regt was deployed at Tuguegarao, on northern Luzon, ~~that~~ and that the first attack by Fourth Air Army planes was attempted from that base, acting independently of the Navy air forces. (See Fourth Air Army monograph, pp. 37-38.) The subsequent Fourth Air Army operations, I believe, fell in the first category of joint operations with naval attack forces, Fourth Air Army supplying the fighter cover. All this was fully within the scope of the local air agreement and required no activation of SHO 1 for the Army air forces. As to your point that the Fourth Air Army aircraft involved in these operations operated under Army and not Navy command, I must confess that I don't know what the command arrangements were. However, it is worth noting that the section of the local air agreement covering attack operations nowhere states that the Army fighter forces will come under Navy command when participating in joint operations against enemy task forces, whereas the section covering interception operations specifically provides that the senior Army air brigade commander will exercise temporary unified command over Army and Navy fighter forces. Now, this would appear at variance with the provisions of the Central Air Agreement; however, it should be borne in mind that the Central Agreement provisions were meant to apply to operations after activation of SHO 1, whereas the local agreement we are concerned with here related specifically to operations against enemy task forces prior to SHO activation. Also, despite the Central Agreement provision, I believe there is considerable doubt that Fourth Air Army planes, even after SHO 1 was activated, ever actually operated under Navy command, and vice versa. Unified command arrangements of this nature went astray with disturbing frequency in the Japanese armed forces. And, as you yourself pointed out, the Central Agreement provisions on this subject were so highly ambiguous as almost to preclude smooth enforcement.

4) One further piece of indirect evidence that there was no activation of SHO 1 for Army air prior to the full SHO 1 activation on 18 Oct is the fact that the air reinforcements from commands other than Fourth Air Army, which were scheduled to concentrate in the Philippines and come under Fourth Air Army command as soon as SHO 1 started, did not begin moving to the Philippines until after the 18th. This is quite clear from Fourth Air Army OpOrd A-509, 18 Oct (which you have). This order, after announcing that SHO 1 has been activated, states in Para 2 that "the 1st echelon of reinforcements will concentrate in accordance with the concentration plan for SHO No. 1 reinforcement units." The fact that the reinforcements didn't start concentrating until the full SHO 1 activation on 18 Oct is in striking contrast to the wholesale shifting of Navy air units which began from 10 October.

I believe that I have covered every angle of your queries, and that the answers given in this report are as complete as can be given on the basis of the information available. I know that the source documents are not as explicit as you might wish, but I think you will agree that the sum total of the evidence is pretty conclusive. I would ask you to bear in mind in

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judging this evidence that it is considerably harder to find explicit evidence that something did not occur, ~~and~~ than to find evidence that something did occur. For when it has not occurred, then nothing is said about it. Hence, it becomes necessary to resort to indirect evidence, although the silence itself constitutes prima facie evidence of some weight.

This report drew out to such length that I was unable to complete it last Friday when I started on it. So I worked on it some more over the week-end at home and am adding these last few paragraphs at the office on Monday. I am sorry that I couldn't get it back to you more promptly. Will now resume my study of the MSS and hope to get through it this week. In order to expedite things, I think that I will detach the portion that I have already completed and return it immediately, so that you may consider my comments on it while I am proceeding with the remainder.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

*Will forward this separately.*

0396

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: June 24

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

I am returning herewith the first portion of the manuscript, pp. 1-113. Am continuing with the remainder.

I received yesterday the command diagram and the write-up for the 16th, which I am adding to the manuscript I have. The diagram looks fine to me except for the division of Imperial GHQ into Army and Navy General Staffs. It should be Army and Navy Sections, and under ~~Gibets~~'s name should be Chief, Naval General Staff, and under Umezumi's name, Chief, Army General Staff. They were really the heads of the Army and Navy Sections, respectively, but their titles remained Chief of Naval General Staff and Chief of Army General Staff.

Sincerely,

CHK

0397

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 25 June

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Returned herewith are pp. 114-136 of your manuscript. Am proceeding with remainder as rapidly as possible.

Sincerely,

CHK

0398

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 1 July

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith pp. 137-177 of the manuscript with my comment sheets attached.

Since I have not heard from you since your letter of the 20th, I am wondering how my comments are being received, whether they are proving helpful, ~~and~~ and whether they have raised any new questions in your mind.

Have you had an opportunity to look at the job description which I forwarded to you? Mr. Cassidy's office indicated that they would like to have it back with your signature by the first of the month, so as to have time to effect the remaining formalities by the 14th, when the contract funds run out. Consequently, though I know that you are extremely occupied, I would appreciate your attention to this matter. I sincerely trust that you have not found the job description objectionable and are holding it up for that reason.

Sincerely,

CHK

0399

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 1 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Am returning herewith pp. 178-232 of the manuscript.

Hope to be through everything you have sent me thus far, by the end of the week.

Let me repeat what I said before, lest you get the impression from my criticisms that I don't like your Japanese discussion as a whole. The farther I go, the more impressed I am with the terrific job you have done in tying together this story of the TAIWAN air battle on the Japanese side. I can assure you that nobody has ever done anything like this for any Japanese operation, and I doubt whether anybody will again. Sometimes, I have to chuckle over your cleverness in expanding something out of nothing. It reminds me of my newspaper days, when I used to (in Tokyo) expand 10-line cable reports of DAVIS Cup tennis matches into complete three or four-page stories.

CHK

0400

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 2 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Am returning herewith pp. 233-277 of manuscript with my comments. Also enclosed are the superseded pages.

Received today the section on Japanese Land-Based Aircraft.

Sincerely,

CHK

0401

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret)

DATE: 3 Jul 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT: Brief paid vacation

Returned herewith, with my comments, are pp. 278-328 of the manuscript. Am proceeding with the section on Japanese land-based aircraft and hope to finish it over the extended 4th of July week-end. Will send it - and also the command diagram - back first thing Monday.

Now, please read no farther unless you are in an expansive and generous mood. As indicated above, I am about to ask you for a brief respite from my labors, with pay if you feel that I deserve it, without if you don't. As you know, I have worked the whole period of the present contract without any let-up, and lately, in order to get through your manuscript with the least possible delay, I have been working on it also at home in the evening and part of my week-ends. I would like to have a little time off to refresh my point of view. From the 14th, I shall be in civil service status, which will mean that I can take no leave for three months. So I would like to take off as much of next week as

0402

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

- 2 -

possible - that is, what is left of it after I have finished this last section of the manuscript that I have at hand, and the command diagram. As I said above, I hope to complete these over the week-end, so that I can send them off to you on Monday. If I can do this, I would then like to take the rest of the week off. Next week will be the final week of the present contract.

If you are about to shoot some more stuff down to me and it is vital that I stay on the job at this time, I will of course do so, even though this will mean no vacation for me until the summer is entirely over. However, if you think that you could spare me next week without upsetting the time schedule you have set, I hope that you will be kind enough to do so.

Received the job description back today and have sent it on to Cassidy. Let me say that the 30% figure is a little misleading as it applies only to translation done first-hand by myself. In addition thereto, I check everything that Mrs. T

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

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initially translates, but this activity was included in the 40% given for planning, organizing and supervisory activity. As you are aware, one objective in the drafting of this description was to minimize the run-of-the-mill translation aspect. Hence, the deliberate shift of some of this activity into the other duty categories. Writing job descriptions is really a fine art, not properly recognized. I consider myself something of a past-master at it.

Sincerely,

CHK

0404

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt. J. J. Rochefort

DATE: 9 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Am forwarding herewith the remaining portions of the Commodore's MSS and the command diagram, with my comments thereon. I tried to hand them over to the Commodore when he dropped in yesterday, but since he was taking off for California, he told me to mail them up to you.

I presume the Commodore notified you by phone of the outcome of his efforts at the Pentagon yesterday, as a result of which I am to remain on a contract basis. Since I had obtained what I asked for in the way of civil service rating and pay (\$7,440 would have given me an actual increase in pay of about \$500 over and above ~~the amount necessary~~ my present pay plus tax-saving), I am coming out on the short end of the deal, and naturally am not very happy over it. Of course, I shall not be tied down to an 8-hour day, but I'd rather have a full-time job paying me enough to live on. So I guess I'll have to resume my search for a better and more permanent job. It will be difficult for me to stick with this for longer than another six months at the most, whether all the work can be completed in that time or not. So far as just the translation is concerned, I feel reasonably hopeful that it can be.

0405

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

- 2 -

FROM :

SUBJECT:

The Commodore and I argued briefly yesterday over some of the points on which he indicated that he had been unable to agree with my comments. He can't convince me, and I can't convince him, so each of us will continue to hold his own views. I think that I could prove my analysis of certain moot points - for example, the C/S Combined Fleet message to COM 1YB on 16 Oct - if the Commodore would accept new interrogation statements by the principals in Tokyo. But I know he won't, despite the fact that - much to my surprise - I found him relying very heavily in his MSS on the USSBS interrogations and on the Demob Bureau monographs, which are sources of the same nature and of scarcely any greater credibility. I would be the last one to say that any post-war source should be accepted at face value. Of course, all statements of this nature must be very carefully examined and evaluated. But if you can get enough statements to check, one against the other, you can nearly always arrive at the true answer.

Trust you are enjoying the Newport summer. Down here it is pretty horrible - like being in a continuous Turkish bath.

Sincerely, CHK

0406

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt. J. J. Rochefort

DATE: 11 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Am forwarding herewith translations of the only portions of the additional air material obtained by Pineau in Tokyo, which proved to be of any value to this study. One portion covers the operations of the SHINCHIKU Detachment of the 221st Air Gp (2AF), 10-19 Oct. This Detachment appears to have been based at SHINCHIKU from the latter part of August 1944. The records end on 19 Oct and do not cover subsequent operations of 221st Air Gp in the PHILIPPINES. The other portion covers operations of 252nd Air Gp (3AF), 14-25 Oct, including both TAIWAN and PHILIPPINES.

I indicated to the Commodore when he was here that I did not think that this small amount of additional material ~~would~~ on the TAIWAN air phase would involve any substantial changes in the MSS, though it should certainly be checked to make sure. It might enable the Commodore to insert a few more details here and there, if he cares to do so. However, I am sure that it will not modify his strength figures or the general narrative of the air operations.

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

- 2 -

SUBJECT:

Received your letter of the 9th while in the middle of the preceding paragraph. Since the additional air material is being forwarded herewith, you will see exactly what it is. The stuff is not air unit action reports, such as we have been doing here, but merely summary records kept by the Navy Merit Awards Section. As such, it is of very limited usefulness. There are, of course, no dispatches whatever.

Mrs. T has been translating BATDIV 1 Ac Rep, not the LYB document. In this connection, it would be helpful for us to have the YAMATO and MUSASHI reports, if you can return them to us. Sometimes, messages are garbled, and it becomes necessary to check them in other documents where they also would be likely to appear.

After today, I am unemployed. No one from Stewart's office has bothered to contact me with regard to the new contract as yet, and I'll be damned if I'll raise a finger to contact them. I think I'll just stay home next week until they get in touch with me. This whole thing has been a fiasco from start to finish, and I'm just a bit fed up.

CHK

0408



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 49, 15 Jul 52

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN  
Naval War College  
NEWPORT, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort,

I have before me your letter of 11 July concerning proposed revisions of the command diagram.

(1) The Imperial GHQ box:

I can see the desirability of showing the Naval General Staff in the diagram, inasmuch as the Japanese sources (interrogation statements, etc.) often use this term interchangeably with Naval Section, Imperial GHQ. I think that your proposed solution - putting it in parentheses under NAVY SECTION - is perhaps the best that can be achieved. It is open to the defect of giving the visual impression that the two are the same thing, which of course is not strictly correct; actually, the key branches of the Naval General Staff were part of the Navy Section, as were also certain organs of the Navy Ministry. However, the diagram by itself cannot be expected to show all the details. As long as the textual explanation, somewhat along the line that I proposed, explains exactly how Imperial General Headquarters was organized, I think that it is all right to adopt your solution for the diagram. The treatment in the MSS, as it was, nowhere explained succinctly just what Imperial GHQ was. I trust that that part has now been revised so as to remedy this defect.

(2) Inclusion of the Supreme War Council:

I am somewhat surprised to learn that the diagram was supposed to show the theoretical chain of command. I was under the impression that it was meant to show the actual command relations that existed up to 17 Oct. That was certainly indicated by the title of the diagram, as well as by the contents. I feel that it would be incongruous as all hell to make part of it theoretical, and the rest of it actual. Nor do I see any necessity for showing the theoretical set-up in the diagram; it has no practical significance for the study of the Leyte battle. I certainly would not go beyond a brief reference to it in the text, as I believe I proposed in my comments. (I know that the command diagrams in the Commodore's previous analyses showed the Emperor and the Supreme War Council, leaving out Imperial GHQ altogether, but I don't think that this is good reason for endeavoring to do the same in this study.)

If, despite the above, you think the theoretical set-up above Imperial GHQ should be shown, then you should show the thing completely and include the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals (GENSUIFU), which was another consultative and honorary body on the same level as the Supreme

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War Council. Thus, you would have the Emperor's box in the middle, with consultation lines running off horizontally to the Supreme War Council on one side and the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals on the other. Also, ~~the~~ consultation lines might be added running diagonally down from these two organs to Imperial GHQ, showing that either of these bodies might be consulted by the Army and/or Navy High Command also, if the latter felt the need of such consultation. This was the theoretical situation. In fact, as far as I am aware, the Army and Navy top commands seldom found it necessary to seek the views of these bodies in regard to operational plans and decisions.

(3) I missed the K. UMEZU. Of course, it should be Y.

The new contract has not been signed yet, but I am going over to Captain Stuart's office this afternoon to find out what the score is. They had better not try and put over any fast ones on me, because I'm in a fighting mood and am liable to tell them to go jump in the lake, and then you'd be minus your chief translator.

One thing that has annoyed me very much is that Admiral Hartman apparently ordered his aides, including the people in Stuart's office, to let me know that he "reluctantly agrees to employ Mr. Kawakami for another year." In every telephone conversation regarding this matter since the end of last week, this "reluctance" has been stressed. Now, why do they take this line with me? Any reluctance on Admiral Hartman's part should have been made plain to Commodore Bates. Expressing it to me and to everyone in OP-29 in this fashion makes it appear that Hartman is personally dissatisfied with me and my performance of this job. And the only people that I will accept such criticism from are the Commodore and yourself, since you alone know the quality of my work. So when and if the new contract is signed, I think that I will return it with a memo to the effect that I have signed it with as much reluctance as that with which Admiral Hartman agreed to it. I'm not trying to make trouble for the Commodore, but I'll be god-damned if I'll take this sort of thing lying down.

I will let you know if you are going to lose my services.

Sincerely,

  
Clarke H. Kawakami

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt. W. J. Rochefort

DATE: 22 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translation of Detailed Action Report for ZUIKAKU.

This report had appended to it the four weather charts which I am forwarding, attached to the translation. We tentatively decided not to translate them until you could take a look at them and see whether they will be of any use for the purpose of the study. If you think that they will be needed, we can make tracings and translate what written notations appear on them.

Am now proceeding to check the translations of two more individual carrier action reports - ZUIHO and CHITOSE.

This is god-awful weather to be working in: it hasn't dropped below 90 for a week, and the nights are almost as bad as the days.

CEK

*Charts  
Returned to Mr. K  
on 7/27/52  
see file*

0411

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt. J. J. Rochefort

DATE: 28 July 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translation of detailed action report for ZUIHO, complete with appended diagrams and charts. Am now starting to check translation of CHITOSE action report and will forward it later this week. That will finish up the available reports of CARDIV THREE units.

While awaiting your chronological list indicating order of translation, I have had Mrs. T translate what we could find on the movement of IYB from LINGGA to BRUNEI and on the movements of 2YB. She is also working on the message logs between 17 and 22 October.

As mentioned in my recent letter, would appreciate your letting us have back the MUSASHI-NAGATO document as soon as you can spare it.

Roger off on another vacation cruise on Morison's yacht up north. And on orders at that! Some guys sure get all the gravy, and you can tell the Commodore that I said so!

CHK

CHK 7-28-52

0412

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Captain J. J. Rockefeller  
FROM : Kawakami  
SUBJECT:

DATE: 29 July 52

Herewith translation of CHITOSE Detailed Action Report with accompanying charts. All charts in the document were done with the exception of the weather charts, which you will find attached in the original to the translation. If you think that the weather charts will be needed, please let us know when you return them, and we will make tracings of them, translating the Japanese notations.

Am proceeding to the checking of translations of two of the Main Body cruiser reports - OYODO and ISUZU. As there ~~is~~ is no report for TAMA, these two will finish off the cruisers in the OZAWA Force.

CHK

CHK 7-29-52

0413



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 50  
31 July 1952

Captain J. J. Rochefort  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort,

I received yesterday your letter of the 28th returning the ZHIKAKU weather charts. We will do these as soon as we can get around to it.

With regard to your query concerning C/S Combined Fleet Dispatch 171201, I have retranslated the message from scratch, and here it is:

Combined Fleet Dispatch 171201:

(1) Assuming that the enemy will make a landing in the SAMAR LEYTE area, it is estimated at the present moment that the First Striking Force will be able to carry out its penetration [T.N.- into LEYTE Gulf] just before dawn on 22 October, and that the Mobile Force Main Body, acting in support, will sortie on the morning of the 19th, advancing to the waters east of LUZON Strait by the evening of 21 Oct. It is desired that the Main Body press sortie preparations on the basis of the above.

(2) From the time that a sortie is ordered for the Mobile Force Main Body [less JUNYO, RYUHO, DESRON 11 and CARDIV 1 (except air units)] and DESRON 31 (repeat order to be issued), the operations of all forces are scheduled to be placed under direct command of CinC Combined Fleet.

(3) Repeat order will be issued incorporating DESRON 31 (less an element) in the Mobile Force Main Body. (End of Dispatch)

*Parameters are correctly placed here.*

You will note that the translation of para (2) has been drastically changed, and that it now makes much better sense, indicating that, when the KdMB sortied, CinC Combined Fleet would take over from OZAWA the command of 1YB and 2YB. Lest you wonder how such a vast error could have been made in the first translation, let me say that the Japanese text was extremely ambiguous and open to two possible and quite different translations. Indeed, of the two, Mrs. T's original translation is the more natural one, although I am quite certain that the one given above is the correct one - as later indicated by CinC Combined Fleet's assumption of direct command over 1YB on 20 Oct. (Incidentally, you may recall that I did not check Mrs. T's translation of the HYUGA report but passed it off onto you as it was, to be typed up at Newport in case you thought it looked okay. I might well have missed this particular error even if I had checked it, however, since, as pointed out above, Mrs. T's translation appears on first examination to be quite correct.) Please let me know if you run across any more dubious passages.

Talked with the Commodore a few minutes over the phone last night. If he thought I sounded a bit dopey, please explain to him that I had a tooth yanked out yesterday afternoon. It broke in the process, necessitating some chiselling and excavating, as a result of which I had to fill up on codein and aspirin.

CHK

0414